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Abstract: This paper studies the strategic interaction between pharmaceu-
tical firms’ pricing decisions and government agencies´ reimbursement decisions
which discriminate between patients by giving reimbursement rights to patients
for whom the drug is most eﬀective. We show that if the reimbursement decision
preceeds the pricing decision, the agency only reimburses some patients if the
private and public health benefits from the new drug diverge. That is, when (i)
there are large externalities of consuming the drug and (ii) the diﬀerence in costs
between the new drug and the alternative treatment is large. Alternatively, if
the firm can commit to a price in advance of the reimbursement decision, we
identify a strategic eﬀect which implies that by committing to a high price ex
ante, the firm can force a listing outcome and make the agency more willing to
reimburse than in the absence of commitment.
Keywords: Pharmaceutical industry, innovation, health policy.
Jel classification: I10, I18, L65.
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1 Introduction
New drugs and medical devices are valuable goods that provide welcomed health
benefits. However, they are also very expensive. According to the OECD, they
are the major cost drivers of health care expenditures1. Given that in most
countries the consumption of medicines is subsidized,2 the growth in the costs
of new drugs has resulted in increasing public spending. In a situation where
resources are limited and there is competition for public funds, the countries’
governments have had to find ways to rationalise the use and dissemination of
these new products. For pharmaceutical goods, agencies have been set up to
decide which drugs are "value for money". These agencies are constituted by
committees of experts, who in consultation with the diﬀerent parties (patients,
providers and firms) decide which drugs are cost-eﬀective. Some examples are:
the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the UK, Pharmac in
New Zealand, Fasi in Austria, the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory in Australia
or the Commission of Transparence in France. The decisions these agencies take
are based on clinical and economic evidence which is usually summarised in a
cost eﬀectiveness analysis. The analysis measures the health benefit associated
with increasing access to a drug, places a monetary value on this benefit and
compares it with the full cost of provision. In doing this the analysis identifies
the group of patients for whom the drug will result in benefits that compensate
the cost.3 The impact of a favourable cost-eﬀectiveness test varies in each
jurisdiction. It will usually imply that national guidelines are issued for public
providers to encourage the use of the drug. In occasions, a positive result will
directly imply that the drug is listed for reimbursement. For example, in the
UK, since January 2002, the NHS is obliged to provide funding for NICE listed
drugs after 3 months of the publication of the listing decision. Sometimes the
eﬀect of a positive result of a cost eﬀectiveness on the listing of the drug will
not be as immediate, but will feed in the considerations made in the decision
making.
We model the strategic interaction between an innovator firm and a decision
maker who chooses whether to list the drug for reimbursement and if so, which
patients should be subsidized. The decision maker does this by comparing the
1For example, pharmaceutical expenditure has doubled in real terms in Sweden and Aus-
tralia between 1990 and 2001, and increased by more than 70% in Canada, Finland, Ireland,
and the US. See OECD, 2004.
2Reimbursement policies vary from country to country. In the UK for example, patients
must pay £6.40 per prescription. In Austria patients pay a fixed amount and a fraction of the
price of the drug. In France patients pay 0%, 65% or 35% of the price of the drug, depending
on the drug’s class.
3For example, in March 2001, NICE considered Orlistat, a drug which fights obesity. The
decision was that the drug should be prescribed to patients who had lost at least 2.5 kilos in
weight by dieting and who either had a body mass index of 30 kg/m2 or a body mass index
of 28 kg/m2 and the presence of significant co-morbidities. In the published report, one can
find considerations about the 1998 direct costs and indirect costs to the NHS associated with
obesity, a summary of the results of several clinical trials of Orlistat, and a cost eﬀectiveness
analysis which estimates the total annual drug costs of implementing the guidance, based on
the current drug price.
3
excess health benefits and the excess costs of enlarging the patient group who is
granted reimbursement rights. The aim of this research is two-fold. Ultimately
we want to understand what are the eﬀects of the listing decision on its provision
costs (public and private4) and on the dissemination of the drug in the presence
of a strategic firm. Yet, to do this, we must study how the listing decision (and
its eﬀects) depends on: the quality of the new drug with respect to existing
treatments, the existence of externalities associated with the consumption of the
drug and the extent to which they are considered by the agency,5 the possibility
that the firm commits to a price before the agency makes a listing decision6
and the possibility that doctors prescribe the drug privately (aside the public
provider) generating an "unsubsidized" demand for the drug.7 We show that
if the reimbursement decision precedes the pricing decision, the agency only
reimburses some patients if the private and public health benefits from the new
drug diverge. That is, when (i) there are large externalities of consuming the
drug and (ii) the diﬀerence in costs between the new drug and the alternative
treatment is large. Alternatively, if the firm can commit to a price in advance
of the reimbursement decision, we identify a strategic eﬀect which implies that
by committing to a high price ex ante, the firm can force a listing outcome and
make the agency more willing to reimburse than in the absence of commitment.
Whilst health economists and managers have paid a lot of attention to the
measurement of the benefits of drugs and the placement of their monetary value,
the analysis of the costs of provision has been highly neglected. With this work,
we point out that the cost of provision will crucially depend on how drugs’ prices
are set, as this will frame the ability of firms to react to the listing news. Whilst
agencies continue to base their analysis on historical prices and sales, they may
be miscalculating the costs of provision and making ill informed judgements.
Listing can have an impact on market variables and a prospective analysis is
needed. This implies understanding how firms react to and anticipate the news
that their drug is being listed for reimbursement and deriving the due eﬀect on
market variables.
>From an academic point of view this research is also interesting as the
special feature of these agencies’ decision is that it is a decision by which "the
government" chooses to discriminate against (or for) a group of the population
which is not based on income levels but rather on how eﬀective the product
to be subsidized is on the welfare of the group. This is the special feature of
4Patients also directly contribute to the financing of their consumption.
5There are several sources of externalities: because of the nature of the disease- for example
infectious, because of knock on eﬀects on the costs of providing health care, for example if
more consumption of the drug results in fewer hospitalizations and because of knock on eﬀects
on families and social services budgets.
6This will depend on the pricing regime. For example in the UK, the 1999-2004 Pharma-
ceutical Price Regulation Scheme which applies to all branded licensed NHS medicines implies
that pharmaceutical firms can initially choose the price at which they introduce a drug. How-
ever, after this, limited price changes must be approved by the Department of Health. This
approval is granted only if the company can proof that its return on capital is below 8.5%.
(For the new PPRS 2005- this is 8.4%) See publication in the Department of Health website.
7 In most countries, drugs can be prescribed by private health care providers and be bought
by patients who then benefit from no subsidy.
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our model as the impact of government agencies’ decisions to list medicines
for patient reimbursement is an under-researched area which has focussed on
reimbursement for low income patients rather than patients with high medical
needs (see Scott Morton 1997). This diﬀerence is crucial and feeds in through
the results.
Our paper is related to a small literature on drug formularies which analyzes
health need based prioritization. Drug formularies are devices used by health
care organizations to limit their expenditure on drugs. They basically list the
drugs which consumers are to be reimbursed for, and, by exclusion, the drugs
oﬀ the reimbursement list which may still be consumed, but are not subsidized.
Olmstead at al (1999) analyze the optimal design of a drug formulary and Borrell
(2003) studies the impact of the existence of drug formularies on drug prices.
Our paper also analyzes the impact of an incentive based formulary on the prices
of pharmaceutical innovations. However, unlike the above mentioned models we
do consider the existence of strategic interactions between the agency and the
innovator via prices.8
A final word of caution is that this work has to be considered as a stepping
stone of a larger research project. Health care provision is highly jurisdiction
specific. Because of this any model of the health care industry suﬀers from the
caveat that it will necessarily not apply everywhere. We have tried to overcome
this problem by making the benchmark model as general as possible in so that
it would still have interesting results and by pinning down what would be a
worst case scenario for reimbursement. Our analysis is based on a situation
where the firm is free to choose the initial price of the drug,9 where patients
are diﬀerentiated by how eﬀective the drug is on them and where the agency
decides which patients to reimburse according to this.10 In the model, the
agency’s objective depends on the private health benefits of patients, the non-
private health benefits derived from the access to the drug (externality) and the
public costs of provision. Consumers with no reimbursement rights are free to
purchase the drug at full price (although they might not do so if it is expensive)
and the firm can not price discriminate between consumers with reimbursement
rights and others.
Section 2 presents the main features of the model. Sections 3 provides the
solution to the Agency’s reimbursement problem and the firm’s pricing problem
when the firm can not commit ex ante to a price. Section 4 extends the analysis
to the situation where the firm can commit to a price before the Agency decides
8Olmstead takes the agency’s costs due to the subsidy as exogenous, whereas Borrell works
with a model with monopolistic competition, which is not suitable to analyze the case of
innovators competing with lower quality oﬀ-patent products.
9This is the government implements no regulation or constraint on the firm’s initial prices.
This reflects the UK and US case. In other countries, there is some price bargaining between
the government agency and the firm (for example, in France the Comite Economique du
Medicament will negotiate the price and the volumes of reimbursed drugs, or in new Zealand,
Pharmac will make the reimbursement decision contingent on some agreed price).
10 Indeed, from reading NICE’s published guidelines, one can see that often the selection of
patients is based on a threshold of a diagnostic test, such as in the case of drugs for obesity,
diabetes or Alzheimer’s disease, or on the description of certain symptoms.
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on listing. Section 5 compares the two outcomes and finally, section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We model the strategic interaction between a pharmaceutical firm producing a
new drug and a government agency that decides whose consumption should be
subsidized.
The pharmaceutical firm launches a new drug of quality q, q > 1. This drug
is patented and the only supplier is the firm. The marginal cost of production
of the drug is constant and equal to c. Patients diﬀer in the improvements of
health they derive from consuming the drug. In other words, the eﬀectiveness
of the drug depends on the patient type.11 By taking the new drug, patient
type θ benefits from an improvement in health of θ · q. We assume that θ is
uniformly distributed in the interval [θ, θ].
There is a second best alternative treatment which yields an improvement
in health to type θ of θ only. This alternative is not listed for reimbursement
and is supplied by a competitive fringe of firms at a given price of c.12 We
assume that θ > c, that is, all patients will either purchase the innovation or
the alternative treatment.
We consider a government agency with the power to decide which patient
types can benefit from an exogenously determined subsidy on the price of the
new drug.13 We define the amount of patients with reimbursement rights as
the coverage level. An important aspect of our model is the assumption that
the agency can treat patient types diﬀerently. This is the agency will select the
coverage level according to the drug’s eﬀectiveness on patients.
The agency chooses the coverage level so as to maximize its objective func-
tion. This objective function captures some of the observed features of the
decision processes in a number of health agencies.14 In addition, the chosen
objective function will serve as a benchmark in the sense that it will provide a
worst case scenario for reimbursement. First, the agency’s objective function
will not include the monetary costs borne by patients or the firm’s profits.15
This aims to reflect the absence of such considerations in the case of the UK
Agency’s public reports, and also implies that our model does not favour a
high level of coverage. In her decision making, the agency does not internalize
11The same drug may result in diﬀering health benefit for patients, depending on the severity
and strand of the illness and the possibility of side eﬀects. Patient heterogeneity was also
considered in Olmstead and Zeckhauser (1999).
12We can interpret this price as the cost of production of an alternative drug or as the cost
of an alternative treatment for the patient. For example, an alternative to taking an obesity
drug is dieting.
13 Subsidies are decided by general law and can not be changed for specific drugs.
14Although we have looked in detail at the public reports of one such agency, the National
Institute for Clinical Evidence in the UK, our intention is not to model the UK case in
particular, but to abstract from it and make more general arguments which will inform this
and other cases.
15Note that this implies that the agency is not maximizing a welfare function.
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the fact that as the coverage increases, profits increase and costs to patients
decrease.
In taking her decision, the agency considers the public costs of reimburse-
ment, the private health benefits from the consumption of the diﬀerent available
treatments- new and old (enjoyed by patients with reimbursement rights and
by patients with no reimbursement rights) and an externality associated with
the dissemination of the new drug. We model the externality as a per capita
externality. We may interpret it as the public health benefits related to the
consumption of the drug16 or the savings accrued by the health care system in
terms of forgone on-going costs associated with the distribution of the drug.17
Taking the stand of Olmstead and Zeckhauser (1999), who describe that
”the goal in health care, at least implicitly, is to spend treatment dollars where
they will produce significant benefits”, we assume that the agency decides to
reimburse the patients for whom the drug is most eﬀective, i.e. those charac-
terized by a larger θ. More specifically, the agency chooses a threshold θL, such
that all patients with θ > θL benefit from the subsidy. We define the coverage
level as θ − θL.The objective function of the agency is described below:18
θZ
θL
θ · q +
θLZ
θ
θ −
θZ
θL
(P − S) + v · (θ − θL),
where P is the full price of the drug, S is the price paid by patients with
reimbursement rights, and v is the per capita externality.
We consider a general form for the consumer price: S = τ + η · P , with
τ/ (1− η) ≤ c. Here, τ represents a flat rate and η a proportional rate. Conse-
quently, the cost per dose for the public funds is: P − S = (1− η)P − τ .
The pharmaceutical company chooses the drug’s price. The firm can freely
choose the price but can not price discriminate between patients with and with-
out reimbursement rights. Patients with no reimbursement rights can purchase
the new drug at full price if they wish to.19
In the following two sections, we analyze two alternative timings for the
timing of events. First, we consider the case in which the coverage decision
precedes the firm’s pricing decision. Second, we analyze the game where the
firm is able to commit to a price before the coverage decision takes place (price
16The existence of such externalities becomes evident in certain conditions like infectious
diseases, serious mental illnesses and conditions involving long term incapacity, but, in general
most medical conditions may in principle have an impact over labour productivity (see e.g.
Francis (1997), Krieg (2002) and Laux (2000)).
17Due to the reduction in hospitalization episodes, specialist needs and other costs.
18Assuming that all patients with reimbursement rights purchase the drug and that patients’
with no reimbursement rights do not purchase the drug.
19All of these assumptions also reinforce a ”worst case scenario for coverage”. The fact
that the firm is free to chose its price and that the firm is unable to price discriminate
between patients with reimbursement and patients with no reimbursement rights both go in
this direction. Similarly, the fact that patients with no reimbursement rights can purchase
the drug privately as well as there is little need to subsidise the product if this is bought by
consumers anyway.
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commitment). We find the subgame perfect equilibrium of these two games
by using backwards induction and we then compare the outcomes. All of the
computations for the results can be found in a mathematical appendix.
3 Benchmark: The game with no price commit-
ment
In this situation, in stage 1 the agency decides the coverage level θ − θL, in
stage 2 the firm chooses its price and in stage 3 patients make their consumption
decisions.
3.1 Stage 3: Patient’s consumption decisions
There are two groups of patients: those with reimbursement rights (if θ is such
that θ > θL), and those without reimbursement rights (if θ is such that θ < θL).
Patients with reimbursement rights buy the new drug if their utility (θ · q − S)
exceeds the utility they would obtain from the alternative treatment (θ − c).
The indiﬀerent consumer is given by: θR = S−c∆q ,where ∆q = q− 1.20 Similarly,
for patients with no subsidy the indiﬀerent consumer is: θF = P−c∆·q . Hence, the
demand function for the new drug is:
D(P ) =



θ − θR; if P > ∆q·θL+c−τη θL
θ − θL; if ∆q·θL+c−τη θL ≥ P > ∆q · θL + c
θ − θF ; if P < ∆q · θL + c.
Figure 1 depicts demand function for the new drug at a given threshold θL.
(insert figure 1 around here (demand graph))
Note that the demand curve has kinks and that its elasticity depends on
whether consumers have access to the subsidy or not. As indicated in Figure
1, the demand function is more inelastic in the range where the price subsidy
applies. It also has a range where it is completely inelastic, corresponding to
prices such that θR < θL < θ
F .
Definition 1 πR = (P − c)(θ − θR) is the profit function when all patients
have reimbursement rights (full coverage: θL = θ) and θ
R∗ = ∆qθ+ηc+τ−c2∆q is
the indiﬀerent consumer that maximizes πR. Similarly πF = (P − c)(θ − θF )
is the profit function when no patients have reimbursement rights (θL = θ) and
θF∗ = ∆qθ+c−c2∆q is the indiﬀerent consumer that maximizes πF .
20Note that there is a divergency between consumer choice and the choice desired by the
agency who would hope that patients internalized the externality in their decisions. This would
be the case if the equation driving patients behaviour was: (θ · q + v − S) > (θ − c) .
8
Note that as long as the threshold θL is larger than θ
R∗, θR∗ will be the
indiﬀerent consumer driving demand for the new drug. Similarly, θF∗ will be
the indiﬀerent consumer provided it falls below the threshold θL.
3.2 The firm’s choice of price
In this section, we characterize the price that maximizes the firm’s profits, P ∗.21
The following proposition summarises the main result:
Proposition 2 There are three cases:
(i) High coverage. If θL < θR∗, then P ∗ = PR = 12η (∆qθ + c + ηc − τ),
and
³
θ − θR∗
´
consumers purchase the drug. That is only some consumers with
reimbursement rights purchase the drug.
(ii) Intermediate coverage. If θR∗ < θL < α, then P ∗ = PL =
θL∆q+c−τ
η
and θ − θL consumers purchase the drug: All consumers with reimbursement
rights purchase the drug.
(iii)Low coverage. If θL > α then P ∗ = PF = 12(∆qθ+ c+ c) and and θ−θ
F∗
consumers purchase the drug, even consumers with no reimbursement rights
purchase the drug.22
insert figure 2 around here (profit graph)
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the result. The thicker func-
tion illustrates the maximum value of the firm’s profit as a function of the re-
imbursement level set by the agency, π(θL). The two other functions represent
πR and πF ,as defined.
In order to understand proposition 2, it is worth acknowledging that the
subsidy creates a wedge between the willingness to pay of consumers with reim-
bursement rights and the willingness to pay of consumers with no such rights.
This implies that in order to serve consumers with no rights, the firm must
reduce its price substantially (so as to make the indiﬀerent consumer θF∗ fall
below θL ). It will only pay to do so if the number of consumers with reim-
bursement rights is suﬃciently low. The shape of the thicker curve in Figure 2
can now be explained.
If coverage is large θL < θ
R∗, the firm can reach the highest level of profit π∗R
as all the consumers who the firm serves have reimbursement rights. However,
if coverage is smaller (θR∗ < θL < α), it pays for the firm to adjust her prices
(setting them high) so as to serve only those consumers who have reimbursement
rights. Yet, there is a level of coverage (θL = α) below which it is not profitable
for the firm to take notice of the small group of consumers with reimbursement
21 In the appendix we find the local maxima in each of the demand regions (interior or corner
solutions) and then we compare those maxima to obtain a global maximum.
22The value of α,

α > θF∗

, can be found in the Appendix. It is defined as the value of
θL such that πF

θF∗

= πR (θL) .
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rights when setting prices. In this range, the best the firm can do is to lower
prices so that consumers with no rights purchase the drug as well.
The impact of listing on the access to the new drug will depend on the
level of coverage. If θL is suﬃciently high (θL > α), the firm will decide to serve
θ−θF∗ patients, where only a few (θ−θL ) will benefit from the subsidy. In this
case, listing the drug will not result in a larger number of patients consuming
it. Only θ − θF∗ consumers would consume the drug, as if no subsidy existed.
For intermediate levels of coverage, θF∗ < θL < α, listing has perverse
eﬀects. Comparing this with the situation with no listing: the prices and the
costs to the public funds are higher and only θ − θL individuals purchase the
drug, as opposed to θ − θF∗ (with θ − θL < θ − θF∗).
Finally, with a high coverage level θ < θL < θ
F∗, listing results in an increase
of the public costs but at the same time there is a larger consumption of the
new drug. Which eﬀect dominates will determine whether listing the drug is
the best option for the agency or not.
3.3 The agency’s coverage decision
Given Proposition 2, it is clear that in choosing the subsidy’s coverage level,
the agency indirectly selects the price regime. We identify the agency’s optimal
choice. We first state the objective function for the agency, which, consistently
with the analysis for the profit function, has a diﬀerent form for the three dif-
ferent levels of coverage described in Proposition 2:23
OF (θL) =



OF1 =
θR
θR∗
qθdθ +
θR∗R
θ
θdθ −
θR
θR∗
(PR − SR) dθ + v(θ − θR∗)
if θL < θ
R∗
OF2 =
θR
θL
qθdθ +
θLR
θ
θdθ −
θR
θL
(PL − SL) dθ + v(θ − θL)
if θR∗ < θL < α
OF3 =
θR
θF∗
qθdθ +
θF∗R
θ
θdθ −
θR
θL
(PF − SF ) dθ + v(θ − θF∗)
if θL > α.
where Si=τ + ηPi.
Finally, the welfare of not listing the drug is:
OFNL =
θZ
θF∗
qθdθ +
θF∗Z
θ
θdθ + v(θ − θF∗) = q θ
2
2 −
θ2
2 −∆q
(θF∗)
2
2 + v(θ − θ
F∗).
Note that the welfare of not listing coincides with the welfare achieved when
there is no coverage θL = θ.
23An evaluation of the last expression can be found in the Appendix.
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Proposition 3 If θF∗ < θL < θ, the agency does not reimburse any patients.
Note that since granting subsidies is costly, the agency only wishes to do so if
there are added (private and public) health benefits. These added benefits only
come across if by listing the drug for reimbursement, there is more access to the
new drug. However, if θL > θ
F∗, listing the drug does not increase demand. As
already explained, if θF∗ < θL < α, demand falls as a result of listing and if
α < θL < θ, demand is determined by θ
F∗ and is unaﬀected by reimbursement.
Since not reimbursing allows the agency to economise on costs, in these regions
not listing is preferred by the agency to any coverage. In other words, from the
point of view of the agency, there is no point in introducing a subsidy which
will be available made available to people who would consume the drug even if
that subsidy did not exist.24
As a consequence, we only must check whether the agency would rather list
the drug for reimbursement and set θL < θ
F∗ or not list the drug at all. In
order to do this, we characterize the shape of the agency’s objective function.
There are two forms for this function as depicted in Figures 3 and 4.25
(insert figures 3 and 4 around here)
The intuition behind these shapes is related to the impact of listing on
the demand for the drug. Starting from no coverage
¡
θL = θ
¢
, an increase
in the level of coverage (a reduction in θL) will initially reduce the agency’s
payoﬀ since, as explained, it will not raise the consumption of the new drug
and will only increase the public costs (this explains the shape of OF3). When
θL = α is reached, there is a downwards discontinuity in the OF function.
The discontinuity is due to the fact that at this point, the firm prefers to set
higher prices and serve only the consumers with reimbursement rights rather
than setting lower prices to serve θ− θF∗ consumers The shape of the function
for decreases in θL beyond α will depend on the strength of the subsidy. If
the subsidy is low, further increases in coverage will actually increase the payoﬀ
to the agency (see OF2 in Figure 3). For high subsidies a further increase in
coverage may have an initial negative impact on the payoﬀ to the agency (see
OF2 in Figure 4). In this range, the added health benefits of a larger coverage
can not compensate for the increase in public costs. Finally, increases in coverage
beyond θ − θR∗ will not have any impact on the agency’s payoﬀ as for those
levels demand for the new drug is fixed at θ − θR∗ (this explains the shape of
OF1).
In conclusion, the only global maximum candidates are either setting θL = θ
to achieve OFNLor setting any θL ∈ (θ, θR∗) to achieve OF1 (θL). We name
these options not listing (θL = θ) and listing (θL ∈ (θ, θR∗)). The following
24 If the agency cared about economic welfare (which would include private costs and the
firm’s profit) there would be ”more” listing. The reason is that when the agency does not list
the drug, this results in larger costs for patients and/or smaller profits for firms. Given our
specification of the agency’s objective function, these negative eﬀects are not internalised by
the agency’s decision who decides not to list the drug excessively from a welfare point of view.
25 See Appendix for a formal proof of the shape of these figures.
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expression is the diﬀerence in payoﬀs between listing and not listing, which we
define as the incentive to list:26
OF1 (θL)−OFNL =
∆q
2
·
µ³
θF∗
´2
−
³
θR∗
´2¶
+v(θF∗−θR∗)−(PR−SR) ·(θ−θR∗).
Since θF∗ > θR∗, the expression shows that the health benefits of listing
exceed those of not listing, but as well that listing the drug is costly in terms of
public funds. The balance of the health and the cost eﬀects determines whether
the agency decides to list.
>From here we deduce that ∂OF1(θL)−OF
NL
∂θF∗ > 0. In other words, as the
number of people who would buy the drug if it weren’t subsidized grows, the
excess benefits of listing the drug for reimbursement are smaller and the incen-
tives to list diminish. Indeed, the agency subsidizes the drug to supplement the
lack of private demand. This is the case when θF∗ is large as most patients
would not buy the drug in the absence of a subsidy, and in this case, it might
be that it is in the interest of the agency to list the drug for reimbursement and
set θL < θ
F∗.27
3.3.1 Comparative statics on the incentive to list, OF1 (θL)−OFNL
In this section, we check how OF1 (θL)−OFNL, varies with v, c, c, θ and ∆q.
Lemma 4 The incentive to list is more likely to be positive for large v and c,
and for small c.
A larger value of the externality results in a larger diﬀerence between the
objective function in regime 1 and the objective function with no reimbursement.
The eﬀect is intuitive. Since more people access the drug with reimbursement,
as the value of v grows, the larger is the eﬀect on the diﬀerence between the
objective functions.
As c− c grows, the diﬀerence between access to the drug with and without
listing increases. As a consequence, the diﬀerence between the values of the
objective functions should increase. However, the eﬀect of the cost diﬀerence
on the diﬀerence in public costs is unclear. Given the sign of the derivative we
can guarantee that even if public costs increase with listing, this adverse eﬀect
is overcome by the larger health benefits.
26We use this terminology but we wish to make the readers aware that this is not a marginal
incentive. The decision of the agency at this stage is binary: either to list or not to list.
27The derivative with respect to θR∗ does not always have the same sign. The reason is
that as θR∗ grows the diﬀerence between the health benefits of listing the drug or not listing
the drug are smaller, but it is unclear whether the costs of listing increase or not: on the
one side, a larger θR∗ is associated with a large price for the drug and a smaller public cost
per dose, yet fewer patients are reimbursed and this might counterbalance the previous eﬀect.
The overall outcome is ambiguous.
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Lemma 5 There exists a η∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that if η < η∗, we obtain that the
incentive to list is decreasing in ∆q and θ. If η > η∗ then the incentive to list
is increasing in θ.
An increase in ∆q has a number of eﬀects on the decision to list which we
detail: On the health side, quality will have a positive direct impact on the
incentives to list as for a given number of excess patients treated the benefits
will be larger. Yet, the number of patients treated is not fixed, and there is an
indirect negative eﬀect through the changes in regime demands that a higher
quality results upon. With higher quality more consumers purchase the drug
with no listing, and the excess access of listing is smaller.28 Moreover changes
in ∆q will also aﬀect the public costs of listing. The increase in ∆q will have a
positive impact of the unit price paid by the agency: ∂(PR−SR)∂∆q > 0 and in this
way a positive impact on the listing costs (fewer incentives to list). However,
depending on the sign of ∂θ
R∗
∂∆q this eﬀect might be partially compensated by a
reduction in the number of patients who have reimbursement rights. This is
when ∂θ
R∗
∂∆q ≥ 0. The overall cost eﬀect can therefore be ambiguous. However,
in the case where subsidies are large, the overall eﬀect is that a higher quality
reduces the incentives to list.
The final lemma in this section reinforces the idea that mainly it is the wedge
between private willingness to pay and public willingness to pay (determined by
the externality) that creates a need to list the drug for reimbursement.
Lemma 6 If 0 < η < 1, v = 0, c = 0 and τ = 0, and c < 2∆qθ
η+
√
7η2+2η
we
obtain that OF1 (θL)−OFNL < 0. This is the agency opts for not listing.29
4 The game with price commitment
In this section, we analyze the outcome of the coverage decision in the case
where the firm can commit to a price in advance of the agency’s decision. In
this game, in stage 1, the firm chooses the price, in stage 2, the agency chooses
the coverage θ − θL and in stage 3 consumers make purchasing decisions. For
simplicity, we focus on the case where v = 0, c = 0 and τ = 0, which allows a
direct comparison with Lemma 6.30
28Whether there are more consumers purchasing the drug with listing depends on the sign
of ∂θ
R∗
∂∆q . However, given that
∂θF∗∂∆q
 >
∂θR∗∂∆q
 even in the case where ∂θ
R∗
∂∆q
≤ 0, we find that
listing the drug results in a smaller access with higher quality. The reason is that consumers
purchasing decisions are more reflective of quality when consumers pay the full price.
29Given c < 2∆qθ
η+
√
7η2+2η
 , ∆qθ > 2c is a suﬃcient condition for no listing for all η, with
η ≤ 1.
30We have also showed in an extended version of the paper, that the results of this section
are qualitatively very similar to the results that one would obtain if τ > 0 and η = 0. However,
note that in the absence of price commitment if η = 0 the profit maximization problem of the
firm is unbounded as demand is fixed.
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Note that, θR = ηP∆q and θ
F = P∆q . However, here the price P is an ex
ante commitment and therefore, ex post it does not depend on whether the
drug is reimbursed or not. The assumption that the firm can commit to a price
generates a substantial diﬀerence in the outcome of the game. It turns out that,
if the firm can commit to a price before the agency decides on coverage level, it
can actually induce listing by choosing a suﬃciently high price.31
4.1 The agency’s coverage decision
For any given P , there are three possible choices of θL:
OF =



OF1 =
θR
θR
θqdθ +
θRR
θ
θdθ − (1− η)P (θ − θR) if θF > θR > θL
OF2 =
θR
θL
θqdθ +
θLR
θ
θdθ − (1− η)P
¡
θ − θL
¢
if θF > θL > θ
R
OF3 =
θR
θF
θqdθ +
θFR
θ
θdθ − (1− η)P
¡
θ − θL
¢
if θL > θ
F > θR
We first find the choice of θL that maximizes the objective function of the
agency, θ∗L. This entails finding the local maxima for each of the three regions
and comparing them. Figures 5 and 6 show the shape of the objective function
and indicate the candidates for global maximum.
(insert figures 5 and 6 around here)
The intuition for these shapes is the same as in section 3. The change in the
timing of the game only aﬀects the shape of OF2. For a low subsidy (η > 1/2),
reductions in θL will have a positive eﬀect on the objective function of the
agency. In this range (see Figure 5) listing increases the consumption of the
new drug by (θF −θL) individuals. This positive impact is only partially oﬀ-set
by the negative eﬀect of the increase in the public as the subsidy is low. As a
result of a larger coverage there is an increase in the OF . Contrarily, in the case
of high subsidies (η < 1/2), the cost eﬀect dominates the access eﬀect if θL is
low enough: when θL > θ
ˆ, OF2 is decreasing in θL (see Figure 6).
Hence, the global optimal coverage level, θ − θ∗L, depends on the level of
the subsidy. With a low subsidy (η > 1/2) there might be no listing (θ∗L = θ)
or listing with θ − θR patients who purchase the drug (if θ∗L < θR). With a
high subsidy (η < 1/2) there can be no listing (θ∗L = θ) or listing where θ − θ∗L
patients purchase the drug with θ∗L > θ
R.
Proposition 7 If η > 1/2 and P > 2∆qθ1+3η or η < 1/2 and P > P
LIM =
2(1−η)∆qθ
2+η2−2η , the agency lists the drug for reimbursement. Otherwise she does not.
31 In the UK, such commitment can be achieved because of the way in which pharmaceutical
”prices” are regulated. According to the Price Regulation Scheme initially the firm is free to
choose a price for the drug, but subsequent changes (especially increases) need to be approved
by the Scheme. Very few changes have been approved.
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By setting a suﬃciently high price the drug company can guarantee a listing
outcome. This might seem counterintuitive because as the price rises the unit
cost of listing rises as well. However, it is also true that as price rises the
diﬀerence between the excess health benefits of listing grow and do so at a
quicker rate than the costs of listing. By committing to a high price the firm is
actually ”threatening” the agency with a very small level of access to the drug
in the case where there is no reimbursement and all the demand is private. This
makes the agency more willing to list, despite the larger cost.
4.2 The firm’s choice of price
In this setting the firm chooses the price taking into consideration the agency’s
response. Clearly, low prices result in no coverage, and high prices result in
some coverage. What matters for the choice of the optimal price P ∗, is the
comparison of the profits of each situation. Having some coverage will generally
benefit the firm, unless the price rise needed to achieve this solution is so large
that the resulting profit is smaller than the profit of no listing.
4.2.1 Low subsidies (η > 1/2)
In this case by forcing listing, the firm positions herself in πR as opposed to πF
in Figure 2. This does not imply that profits are larger with listing as this really
depends on how large the price threshold for the listing regime is.
Proposition 8 If η > 1/2, the firm sets P ∗ = ∆qθ+ηc2η ,
32 which yields profits:
1
4η∆q (∆qθ − ηc)2, the drug is listed for reimbursement, and the demand for the
new drug is (θ − θR∗). All consumers who purchase it are reimbursed.
If the subsidy is small, the firm can set the interior price that maximizes the
profit function with listing, as this price is suﬃciently high so that the agency
lists the drug. Recall that lemma 6 tells us that with no price commitment
and for c < 2∆qθ
η+
√
7η2+2η
 the drug would not be listed for reimbursement. The
question is why it is that with price commitment the agency decides to list.
The reason is simple: by committing to a high price the firm is threatening the
agency with limited access to the drug in the case that the drug is not listed.
On the face of such event the agency decides to list.
4.2.2 High subsidies (η < 1/2)
With high subsidies the result is not as clear cut as Proposition 8. There are cir-
cumstances where it is in the firm’s interest to induce listing, and circumstances
where this is not true.
With high subsidies if the drug is listed for reimbursement, the firm’s profits
are: (P−c)
³
θ − (1−η)P∆q
´
. These profits achieve a maximum value of 1−η4∆q
³
∆qθ
1−η − c
´2
32Note that P∗ = PR for c = 0 and τ = 0.
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at P+ = c2 +
∆qθ
2(1−η) and θ
+ = ∆qθ+(1−η)c2∆q . This profit value exceeds the maxi-
mum profit value when no patient holds reimbursement rights. Therefore, if P+
is high enough to induce listing, the firm will set this price and induce listing.
However, there will be situations in which P+ is too small to induce listing and
where the firm will need to generate an upwards distortion from the optimal
price P+ in order to induce listing. In some of these cases, it will be better for
the firm not to induce listing. The following proposition presents the conditions
under which the firm will induce listing.
Proposition 9 For η < 1/2
9.1. If c > c∗ = ∆qθ(2+3η
2−6η)
(1−η)(2+η2−2η) , P
∗ = P+. The drug is listed for reimburse-
ment and
¡
θ − θ+
¢
patients purchase it and are subsidized.
9.2. If 0 < c < c∗, P+ does not induce listing.33 In this case, the firm might
choose PLIM = 2(1−η)∆qθ2+η2−2η (the smallest price that induces listing, with an in-
diﬀerent consumer θLIM ) or P = 12(∆qθ + c) and induce no listing. The firm
sets P ∗ = PLIM if:
θLIM < z or θLIM − θ+ <
u
η

(∆qθ)2−c2(1−η)

2∆q
where z is defined as the threshold value of θ that induces listing, this is z ∈
(θ+, θ) such that πL(z) = πNL∗ = 14∆q (∆qθ − c)2.
An illustration of the proposition above is provided in Figure 7.
Corollary 10 A numerical simulation indicates that for c = 0, if η is smaller
than approximately 0.2, the firm will choose P = 12(∆qθ + c) and not induce
listing, otherwise the firm will choose PLIM and induce listing.
5 Comparison of commitment and non commit-
ment outcomes
In this section we compare the outcome with price commitment with the out-
come described in lemma 6 (non price commitment). The following table sum-
marises the comparison for all cases34.35
(insert Table)
33Note that c∗ > 0 only if 0≤ η ≤ 0.42. Hence if 0.42 ≤ η we have that c∗ < 0 and only
case 9.1 is relevant.
34 In the appendix we show that 2∆qθ
η+
√
7η2+2η
 > c∗.
35 In this table we report the outcome where c∗ > 0 (which can happen only if 0 ≤ η ≤ 0.42).
If 0.42 ≤ η, cases e and f in the table are not relevant.
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The table confirms the intuition that the firm’s price commitment results
in more listing. This is due to the eﬀect of the ex ante pushing of the prices
which results in a listing outcome. In most circumstances (cases b, d and e) this
benefits the firm who will commit to such high prices. However, if the subsidy
is high and the cost is large (case c), the commitment of the firm results in a
reduction of profits. The reason for this is that in this case in the absence of price
commitment the drug would be listed anyway and there would be no rationing
of the patients who can access it with a subsidy. Instead, with commitment
as the price is higher, the agency rations the number of patients who have
reimbursement rights and therefore the profits of the firm are smaller. In this
case the firm will not commit to a price.
The comparison of the objective functions for the agency under commitment
and no commitment tells the other side of the story. If the subsidy is small or
if it is high but the costs of production are small, the absence of commitment
favours the agency (these are cases b, e and partly d). If instead the subsidy is
large and the production costs are large the commitment favours the agency.
6 Conclusions
This paper identifies the plausible eﬀects of the strategic interaction between
government agencies making decisions to subsidize patient consumption of drugs
based on how eﬀective these drugs are on diﬀerent patient groups and firms
making decisions about drug prices. We focus the analysis on the costs of
drug provision, a relatively under-researched area, as most of the literature has
considered the measurement of health benefits and its monetary value. Our
remit is to make two simple points about this cost:
1. The cost of provision can not be based on historical prices and sales as the
reimbursement decision may have an impact on market prices and quantities.
A prospective analysis is needed.
2. Because of the former, it is crucial to understand how drug prices are set,
and how firms react to and anticipate ”reimbursement news”.
The paper deals with these two points in a specific setting, which is an initial
stepping stone of a larger research project where other cases should be analyzed.
The analysis is based on a situation where patients can purchase the drug at
full price if they have no reimbursement rights, where the pharmaceutical firm
is free to choose prices but can not price discriminate between subsidized and
unsubsidized consumers, and where the agency chooses a level of coverage (or
group of consumers to subsidize) taking into consideration the excess health
benefits of doing so (including private benefits and externalities) and balancing
those against the excess public costs. In the model, the agency chooses an
eﬀectiveness threshold, and patients who fall in this range are subsidized.
In our benchmark scenario, the agency takes the listing decision first and
then the firm chooses the price. Here, the main reason for listing the drug for
reimbursement is to expand the benefits of the drug to consumers who would
not purchase it privately, despite the public cost. Given the agency’s aim of
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reducing public costs, subsidizing a few needy consumers makes no sense if those
consumers would have purchased the drug at full price. Hence, the agency’s
decision will be either to subsidize no patients at all, or to subsidize some, but
in this case it will give reimbursement rights as well to patients who would
not have purchased the drug at full price.36 It pays to do the latter whenever
the private and public benefits from drug access really diverge- this is when
consumers purchase too little privately. This might happen for several reasons:
(i) patients are not willing to pay for the drug, but there are large externalities
of them consuming the drug and (ii) the diﬀerence in costs between the new
drug and the alternative treatment is large. Indeed, if there is the diﬀerence
between the costs is small and there is no externality, the agency reimburses no
consumers. It is also interesting to note that if the subsidy is high, the more
eﬀective the new drug is (higher quality), the fewer are the incentives to list it.
The reason for this is that as the quality increases, the patients are more willing
to purchase the drug privately.
In an alternative scenario, we study what the outcome would be if the firm
could commit to a price before the agency decided on the listing decision. We
prove that in this situation, for most parameter configurations, the firm decides
to increase prices as this is a means to induce listing. The mechanism is the
following: by committing to a high price ex ante, the firm is ”promising” small
access to the drug in the if there is no reimbursement. If the promise is credible,
the agency is more willing to reimburse. We do not identify in the paper what
makes the promise credible, but we want to note that regulations which imply
some stickiness in prices will make those commitments possible. This is the case
with the UK regulation for drug prices, the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation
Scheme, which allows initial free pricing for a drug but then makes prices very
diﬃcult to change.
One must note that if private demand did not exist (for example because
doctors were forbidden from recommending unlisted treatments) or because the
cost of the drug would be so high that no consumer could purchase it at full
price (which is part of our model), then the strategic eﬀect of price increases
with commitment would disappear. Increasing the price would not constitute
a threat to diminish private demand and would only result in a larger public
unit cost. In this situation, if in the absence of commitment, the agency would
decide not to reimburse, then the firm would only "force" a listing outcome by
reducing the price relative to the optimal price with reimbursement. This is
the result would be the opposite to the one obtained. Our model then becomes
more relevant in a world of mixed public/private provision of health care.
36This is, in the end, the choice of an optimal coverage level, boils down to a binary decision:
either the agency does not list, or it lists and gives reimbursement rights to a "large" amount
of patients.
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8 Appendix
Section 3.1: Full derivation of the firm’s demand function.
Since θF > θR, there are 3 regimes:
Regime 1, (θL < θR): The demand of patients with reimbursement rights is
DR = θ − θR. There is no demand of patients with no reimbursement rights.
Regime 2, (θR < θL < θF ): The demand of patients with reimbursement
rights is DR = θ − θL. There is no demand of patients with no reimbursement
rights.
Regime 3, (θF < θL): The demand of patients with no reimbursement rights
is DF = θL − θF . All patients with reimbursement rights purchase the drug:
DR = θ − θL.
Finally the demand function is:
D =
(
min
n
θ − θR, θ − θL
o
if θF > θL
(θ − θL) + (θL − θF ) = θ − θF if θF < θL
Proposition 2.
We start by finding optimal decisions of the firm for each coverage regime:
Regime 1, (θL < θR): The profit maximization problem is:
max
{θR}
h
πR(θ
R) = 1η
³
∆qθR + c− τ − ηc
´³
θ − θR
´i
such that θR>θL. The in-
terior solution is θR∗ = ∆qθ+ηc+τ−c2∆q and PR =
1
2η
¡
∆qθ + c+ η · c− τ¢ . The
value of profits at this solution is: π∗R =
1
4η∆q
¡
∆qθ − ηc− τ + c
¢2
. Note that
θR∗ > θL implies that θ2 +
ηc+τ−c
2∆q > θL (condition A1).
Regime 2, (θR < θL < θF ): The profit maximization problem is:
max
{P}
£
πL(θL) = (P − c)
¡
θ − θL
¢¤
. Since πL(θL) is increasing in P , the op-
timal price is the largest price that guarantees that consumer θL purchases
the drug. Hence: PL =
θL∆q+c−τ
η . The value of profits at this solution is
π∗L =
θL∆q+c−τ−ηc
η
¡
θ − θL
¢
.
Regime 3, (θF < θL): The profit maximization problem is:
max
{θF}
h
πF (θ
F ) =
³
∆qθF + c− c
´³
θ − θF
´i
such that θF ≤ θL. The solution is
PF =
1
2
¡
∆qθ + c+ c
¢
and θF∗ = ∆qθ+c−c2∆q . The profits evaluated at this solu-
tion are: π∗F =
1
4∆q
¡
∆qθ + c− c
¢2
. Note that θF∗ ≤ θL is satisfied if ∆c2∆q < θL
(condition A3).
Boundary Conditions
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An interior solution in Regime 1 (respectively, Regime 3) requires A1 (A3) to
hold. If A1 (A3) is not satisfied, the corner solution for the regime is a price
such that θR = θL, (respectively, θ
F = θL). This corner solution yields profits of
πR(θL) =
1
η (∆qθL + c− τ − ηc)
¡
θ − θL
¢
,
¡
πF (θL) = (∆qθL + c− c)
¡
θ − θL
¢¢
.
Note that, θR∗ < θF∗ since τ/(1− η) < c < ∆qθ. Hence, A1 and A3 are incom-
patible. If one holds, the other does not. Note also that if, θF∗ < θL < θ
R∗
neither θF∗ nor θR∗ are valid solutions. As a consequence we can establish the
candidate solutions for each of the following cases:
Case 1. If θL > θ
R∗ we must compare: πR (θL) , π∗L and π
∗
F .
Case 2. If θF∗ < θL < θ
R∗ we must compare: πR (θL) , π∗L, and πF (θL) .
Case 3. If θL < θ
F∗, we must compare: π∗R, π
∗
L and πF (θL).
Since πR (θL) = π∗L > πF (θL) ,in Case 2 the global solution is π
∗
L. For
the other cases, the comparison simplifies to: Case 3. {π∗R, π∗L} , and Case 1.
{π∗L, π∗F }.
In Case 3 the global solution is π∗R since π
∗
R > πR (θL) = π
∗
L.
In Case 1 we obtain that there exists an α, with α > θR∗ such that if θL > α
then the global solution is π∗F . Otherwise, the global solution is π
∗
L. The value
of α is:
α = θR∗ +
t
(∆qθ+ηc+τ−c)2−η(∆qθ+c−c)2−4∆qθ(τ+ηc−c)
2∆q .
The proof of this last result is in three steps:
Step 1. If θL = θ, then π∗L = 0 and π
∗
F − π∗L > 0.
Step 2. π∗F −π∗L = 14∆q
¡
∆qθ + c− c
¢2− 1η ¡θ − θL¢ (∆qθL + c− τ − ηc) . Then:
∂(π∗F−π
∗
L)
∂θL = −
1
η ·
¡
−2∆q · θL +∆qθ + ηc+ τ − c
¢
= 2∆qη ·
³
θL − θR∗
´
. A3 im-
plies that ∂(π
∗
F−π
∗
L)
∂θL > 0.
Step 3. Finally, we find α, defined as the value θL such that θL > θ
R∗ and
π∗F − π∗L = π∗F − πR(θL) = 0. Note that: π∗F − π∗L = 0 implies that:
θ2L∆q−θL
£
∆qθ + ηc+ τ − c
¤
+
h
η
4∆q
¡
∆qθ + c− c
¢2
+ θ (τ + ηc− c)
i
= 0. This
is:
θ
π∗F=π
∗
L
L =
[∆qθ+ηc+τ−c]±
u
(∆qθ+ηc+τ−c)
2−4∆q
k η
4∆q (∆qθ+c−c)
2
+θ(τ+ηc−c)
l
2∆q =
θR∗ ±
r³
θR∗
´2
− η(∆qθ+c−c)
2
+4∆qθ(τ+ηc−c)
(2∆q)2 .
Since α > θR∗, we eliminate the negative root: α is the positive root. Finally,
we show that α > θF∗. Recall that: (i) θF∗ maximizes π∗F , (i) θ
R∗ maximizes
π∗R, (iii) for any z, πR (z) > πF (z) and (iv) θ
R∗ < min{α, θF∗}. Assume that
α < θF∗.Then there exists a z, such that α < z < θF∗ and πR (z) = πF (z) .
This contradicts (iii).
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Section 3.3: Analysis of the objective function.
The value of the objective function is:
OF (θL) =



OF1 =
qθ2
2 −
θ2
2 −
∆qθR∗
2
2 −
θ−θR∗
2η . (1− η) (∆q θ + c+ ηc)−
− (1 + η) τ + v
³
θ − θR∗
´
if θL < θ
R∗
OF2 =
qθ2
2 −
θ2
2 −
∆qθ2L
2 −
1
η ·
¡
θ − θL
¢ · ((1− η) (c+∆qθL)− τ)+
v
¡
θ − θL
¢
if θR∗ < θL < α
OF3 =
qθ2
2 −
θ2
2 −
∆qθF∗
2
2 −
θ−θL
2
³
(1− η)
³
c+∆qθF∗ + c
´
− 2τ
´
+
+v
³
θ − θF∗
´
if θL > α
Shape of the objective function.
Note that θF∗ and θR∗ do not depend on θL. As a consequence, OF1 is constant
in θL and OF3 is increasing in θL.
We now study the shape of OF2. Note that:
∂OF2
∂θL = −∆qθL +
1
η ((1− η) (c+∆qθL)− τ)−
1−η
η ∆q
¡
θ − θL
¢
− v.
Thus, ∂OF2∂θL = 0 if θL = θ
MIN
L =
(1−η)(∆qθ−c)+τ+vη
(2−3η)∆q .
Note also that: ∂
2OF2
∂θ2L
= −∆q + 1−ηη ∆q +
1−η
η ∆q = ∆q
2−3η
η .
Therefore:
a. If η < 23 ,
∂2OF2
∂θ2L
> 0 and θMINL ∈ (θR∗, α) is a minimum for OF2.
b. If η > 23 ,
∂OF2
∂θL < 0 and
∂2OF2
∂θ2L
< 0. OF2 is decreasing and convex in
θL ∈ (θR∗, α). To see this, note that since η >
2
3
and ∆qθ− c > 0 we have that
2−3η
η ∆qθL−
1−η
η
¡
∆qθ − c
¢
< 0, which implies that 1−ηη 2∆qθL−∆qθL+
1−η
η c−
1−η
η ∆qθ < 0, i.e.:
∂OF2
∂θL < 0.
Finally, we note that OF1 = OF2(θ
R∗), i.e., OF is continuos at θR∗. However,
OF has a discontinuity at α.
Lemma 4. The following expression is the diﬀerence in payoﬀs between listing
and not listing:
∆q
2 ·
µ³
θF∗
´2
−
³
θR∗
´2¶
+v
³
θF∗ − θR∗
´
−(θ−θR∗)
³
1−η
η (∆qθ
R∗ − τ + c)− τ
´
which after some algebra we can rewrite as:
1
4∆q · [(c(1− η)− τ)(∆qθ + 2v) + c2/2(1 + 2η)− 3/2 · (cη + τ)2−
1
η (∆qθ + c− τ)
2 + (∆qθ + c)2 − c(c(1− η)− τ))]
Then:
∂OF1(θL)−OFNL
∂v =
1
2∆q (c(1− η)− τ)) > 0.
∂OF1(θL)−OFNL
∂c =
1
4∆q [(1− η) · (∆qθ + 2v) + c(1 + 2η − 3η2)− 3ητ−
22
(1− η) c] =
= 14∆q
£
(1− η)
¡
∆qθ + 2v + c− c
¢
+ 3η · ((1− η) c− τ)¤ > 0.
∂OF1(θL)−OFNL
∂c = −
1
η (∆qθ + c− τ) + (∆qθ + c)− (c(1− η)− τ)) =
− 1η [(∆qθ+ c)(1− η)− τ ]− (c(1− η)− τ)) < 0, since τ < (1− η) · (∆qθ+ c).
Lemma 5.
Note that the denominator of OF1 (θL)−OFNL is increasing in ∆q. Define the
numerator of the OF1 (θL)−OFNL as: Num(∆qθ) = (c(1−η)−τ)(∆qθ+2v)+
c2/2(1 + 2η)− 3/2 · (cη + τ)2−
1
η (∆qθ + c− τ)2 + (∆qθ + c)2 − c(c(1− η)− τ)).
Changes in ∆q and θ have an identical eﬀect on Num(∆qθ). If Num(∆qθ)
is decreasing in ∆qθ, then OF1 (θL) − OFNL is decreasing in ∆q and θ. If
Num(∆qθ) is increasing in θ then OF1 (θL) − OFNL is increasing in θ. We
check under which conditions Num(∆qθ) is decreasing in ∆qθ.
∂Num(∆qθ)
∂(∆qθ) = (c(1− η)− τ)−
2
η (∆qθ + c− τ) + 2(∆qθ + c) =
1
η [η(c(1− η)− τ)− 2(∆qθ + c− τ) + 2η(∆qθ + c)] =
= 1η [η(c(1− η)− τ)− 2(1− η)∆qθ − 2((1− η)c− τ)].
If this last expression is negative, then Num(∆qθ) is decreasing in ∆qθ. How-
ever, note that ∂Num(∆qθ)∂(∆qθ) can have either a negative or a positive sign. For
example, if η = 0, then ∂Num(∆qθ)∂(∆qθ) → limη→0[
1
η [−2∆qθ − 2[c − τ ]] < 0 and if
η = 1, then ∂Num(∆qθ)∂(∆qθ) = [−ητ + 2τ ] > 0. Indeed
∂Num(∆qθ)
∂(∆qθ) is increasing in η :
∂
∂η
³
∂Num(∆qθ)
∂(∆qθ)
´
= −c+ 2(∆qθ + c− τ)/η2 = 2(∆qθ+c−τ)−η
2c
η2 > 0.
Hence, for small values of η we obtain that ∂Num(∆qθ)∂(∆qθ) < 0 and for large values
of η, ∂Num(∆qθ)∂(∆qθ) > 0.
Lemma 6.
Here:
OF1 (θL)−OFNL =
= 14∆q [c(1− η)(∆qθ) + c2/2(1 + 2η)− 3/2 · (cη)2 − 1η (∆qθ)2 + (∆qθ)2)] =
= 14∆qη [−(1− η)(∆qθ)2 + (1− η)η∆qθc+ c2/2(η + 2η2 − 3η3)] =
= (1−η)4∆qη [−(∆qθ)2 + ηc∆qθ + c2/2(η + 3η2)].
Hence, if −(∆qθ)2 + ηc∆qθ + c2/2(η + 3η2) < 0 then OF1 (θL)−OFNL < 0.
Studying the last expression we obtain that OF1 (θL) − OFNL < 0 is negative
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if ∆qθ exceeds c/2(η +
p
7η2 + 2η) (the positive root of the polynomial). Note
that c/2(η +
p
7η2 + 2η) is increasing in η. Hence, OF1 (θL) − OFNL is least
likely to be negative when η = 1. Note that in this case c/2(η +
p
7η2 + 2η)
= 2c. In conclusion, if ∆qθ > 2c = maxη{c/2(η +
p
7η2 + 2η)}, 0 ≤ η < 1,
then ∆qθ > c/2(η +
p
7η2 + 2η) for all η, 0 ≤ η < 1, and we can conclude that
OF1 (θL)−OFNL < 0.
Section 4: Price commitment. Local maximization of OF with respect
to θL.
We start by finding the value of θL that maximizes each region of OF .
1. θL < θR. Here: OF1 = q θ
2
2 −
θ2
2 −∆q
θR
2
2 −(1− η)P
³
θ − θR
´
, and ∂OF1∂θL = 0.
Therefore, the agency is indiﬀerent between any θL, for any θL ∈ (θ, θR)
2. θR < θL < θF . Here: ∂OF2∂θL = −∆qθL + (1− η)P = 0 ⇒ θ
ˆ = (1−η)P∆q and
∂2OF2
∂θL = −∆q < 0. Hence: OF
∗
2 = q
θ2
2 −
θ2
2 −∆q
θˆ2
2 − (1− η)P
³
θ − θˆ2
´
.
Note that θF > θˆ > θR implies that ηP < (1− η)P < P . If η < 1/2, we
have that θF > θˆ > θR but if η > 1/2, we have that θF > θR > θˆ, which
invalidates OF ∗2 as a solution as consumer θ
ˆ does not purchase the drug.
3. θF < θL. Here:
∂OF3
∂θL
= (1− η)P > 0 ⇒ θ∗3L = θ and OF ∗3 = q θ
2
2 −
θ2
2 −
∆q θ
F2
2 .
Proposition 7.
1. η > 1/2. We compare OF ∗1 and OF ∗3 :
OF ∗1 −OF ∗3 =
µ³
θF
´2
−
³
θR
´2¶
− P (1− η)
³
θ − θR
´
=
³
θF − θR
´³
θF + θR
´ ∆q
2
−P (1− η)
³
θ − θR
´
= (1−η)∆q P
³
(1+η)P
2 −
¡
∆qθ − ηP
¢´
.
Note that (1−η)∆q P
³
(1+3η)P
2 −∆qθ
´
> 0 iﬀ P > 2∆qθ(1+3η) .
Recall that ηP < ∆qθ. This condition is compatible with P > 2(1+3η)∆qθ as
2η − 3η < 1.
2. η < 1/2. We compare OF ∗2 and OF
∗
3 :
OF ∗2 −OF ∗3 =
∆q
2
µ³
θF
´2
−
³
θˆ
´2¶
− (1− η)P
³
θ − θˆ
´
=
∆q
2
³
θF + θˆ
´³
θF − θˆ
´
− (1− η)P
³
θ − θˆ
´
=
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P
∆q
µ
1
2
(2− η)Pη − (1− η)
¡
∆qθ − (1− η)P
¢¶
> 0.
Note that OF 2∗ −OF 3∗ > 0 iﬀ P > (1−η)∆qθ22+η2−2η .
Recall that ηP < ∆qθ. This last condition is compatible with P > (1−η)∆qθ22+η2−2η
since η < 12 implies that
2(1−η)
2+η2−2η <
1
η .
Proposition 8.
If the drug is listed for reimbursement the firm’s profits are: (P − c)(θ− θR) =
(P − c)(θ− ηP∆q ). These profits are maximized when P
∗ = ∆qθ+ηc2η . Their value is
1
4η∆q (∆qθ−ηc)
2. This value exceeds the maximum value of the profits achieved
with no reimbursement: 14∆q (∆qθ − c)2. Moreover, P ∗ =
∆qθ+ηc
2η >
2∆qθ
1+3η , since
∆qθ (1− η) + η (1 + 3η) c > 0. This implies Proposition 8.
Proposition 9.
Recall that for η < 12 , if P > P
LIM the agency sets θ∗L =
(1−η)P
∆q , but if
P < PLIM , the agency sets (θL = θ). For P+ to encourage listing, it must be
that P+ > PLIM , this is that c > ∆qθ
³
2−6η+3η2
(1−η)(2+η2−2η)
´
. If this last inequality
holds, Proposition 9.1 follows.
However, if c < ∆qθ
³
2−6η+3η2
(1−η)(2+η2−2η)
´
, P+ does not induce the agency to list the
drug and the firm’s optimal choice will either be PLIM (which induces listing)
or 12
¡
∆qθ + c
¢
, which maximizes the profit with no listing (πF ). Proposition
9.2 provides the condition under which PLIM is best. The following steps yield
such condition.
Step 1 : We define the profits of no listing (θL = θ) and of listing (θL = θ
∗
L)
as a function of the indiﬀerent consumer I. With no listing I = P/∆q so:
πNL [I] = (∆qI − c)
¡
θ − I
¢
. With listing, I = θ∗L = (1 − η)P/∆q so: πL [I] =
(P − c)
¡
θ − I
¢
=
1
1− η (∆qI − (1− η)c)
¡
θ − I
¢
.
Step 2 : We proof that for any fixed I ∈ [0, θ), πL [I] > πNL [I] .37 Note that:
πL − πNL = ( 11−η (∆qI − (1− η)c) − (∆qI − c))
¡
θ − I
¢
. Hence if θ > I, then
πL − πNL > 0.
Step 3 : We define z as the value of θ that induces listing, this is z ∈ (θ+, θ) such
that πL(z) = πNL∗ = 14∆q (∆qθ−c)
2. Therefore, z is such that:
³
∆qz
(1−η) − c
´ ¡
θ − z
¢
=
(∆qθ−c)
2
4∆q .This equation has two roots:³
∆qθ+(1−η)c
2∆q
´
±
u
η

(∆qθ)2−c2(1−η)

2∆q = θ
+ ±
u
η

(∆qθ)2−c2(1−η)

2∆q .
37 If
−
θ = I, then πNL [I] = πL [I] .
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Note that the smallest root is smaller than θ+, therefore it can not induce list-
ing. Hence, z = θ+ +
u
η

(∆qθ)
2−c2(1−η)

2∆q . Note for any θ > z, π
L < πNL∗ and
for any θ < z, πL > πNL∗.
Step 4: If the price is PLIM , the indiﬀerent consumer is θLIM = θL
¡
PLIM
¢
=
(1−η)PLIM
∆q =
1−η
∆q
³
2(1−η)∆qθ
2+η2−2η
´
= 2(1−η)
2θ
2+η2−2η . Note that θ
LIM > θ+ since PLIM >
P+ =
c
2
+ ∆qθ2(1−η) .
Step 5: Given steps 3 and 4 we can conclude that: if θLIM < z, then, the firm
will prefer to induce listing and PLIM will be the global maximum. This is the
condition stated in proposition 9.2.
Corollary 10. Note that: θLIM < z ⇔ 2(1−η)
2
−
θ
2+η2−2η−
−
θ
2 <
c(1−η)
2∆q +
yxxwη
#
∆q
−
θ
2
−(1−η)
$
c2
2∆q ,
which can be rewritten as: ∆q
−
θ 2+3η
2−6η
(2(1−η)+η2)(1−η)−c <
1
1−η
vuutηÃµ∆q−θ¶2 − (1− η) c2!.
The above inequality can revert sign depending on the value of η. For example
if c = 0, the condition simplifies to 2 + 3η2 − 6η −
¡
2 + η2 − 2η
¢√
η < 0.This is
satisfied when η > 0.2.
Section 5.
We first prove that 2∆qθ
η+
√
7η2+2η
 > c∗. This implies that:
2(1− η)(2 + η2 − 2η)− (η +
p
7η2 + 2η)(2 + 3η2 − 6η) > 0
This expression holds for η = 0 and η = 1/2.Below, we provide a numerical
evaluation of the expression for 0 < η < 1/2:
0.50.3750.250.1250
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
x
y
The expression has a minimum at η = 0.326. We evaluate the expression in
this point to obtain its positive value 1.4134.
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Section 5, Table 1: Proof of cases c, d and e
Note that in all these cases η < 12
Case c (comparison of the outcomes with no price commitment
(θR∗) and price commitment (θ+)).
Note that P+ > PR and θ
R∗ < θ+.38 This implies that the demand is larger
with no price commitment and that the price is larger with commitment.
Profit Comparison:
Since π+ = 1−η4∆q
³
∆qθ
1−η − c
´2
and πR∗ = 14η∆q
¡
∆qθ − ηc
¢2
: πR∗ > π+ ⇔
1
4∆q (
1
η
¡
∆qθ − ηc
¢2
> 11−η
¡
∆qθ − (1− η)c
¢2
.This expression holds iﬀ
(1− 2η)((∆qθ)2 − η(1− η)c2) > 0. Since η < 12 and ∆qθ > c we conclude that
πR∗ > π+, i.e.: πNPC > πPC .
Agency’s objective function comparison:
Note that OFNPC = q
θ
2
2
− θ
2
2
−∆q θ
R∗2
2
− (1− η)PR
³
θ − θR∗
´
and
OFPC = q
θ
2
2
− θ
2
2
−∆q θ
+2
2
− (1− η)P+
¡
θ − θ+
¢
.
Hence:
OFPC −OFNPC = ∆q2 (θ
R∗2 − θ+
2
) + (1− η) (PR
³
θ − θR∗
´
− P+
¡
θ − θ+
¢
) =
= ∆q
8(∆q)2
³
(∆qθ + ηc)
2 − (∆qθ + (1− η) c)2
´
+
+ (1− η)
³
∆qθ+ηc
2η
³
∆qθ−ηc
2∆q
´
− ∆qθ+(1−η)c2(1−η)
³
∆qθ−(1−η)c
2∆q
´´
.
Note that if η → 0 then OFPC − OFNPC → +∞.Recall that if η → 1/2,
OFPC−OFNPC → 0.We now prove thatOFPC−OFNPC > 0 for 0 < η < 1. By
simplifying the expression we obtain: ∆qθ (1− 2η) ∆qθ − ηc
η
+
1− 4η (1− η)
2
c2.
To prove this, take the derivative of this expression with respect to c:
−∆qθ (1− 2η) + [1 − 4η (1− η)]c. Since 0 < η < 1/2 and ∆qθ > c, that
this derivative is negative. Hence the expression is least likely to hold for
large c. A suﬃcient condition would be if it held for c = ∆qθ. In this case
OFPC − OFNPC becomes: c2 (1− 2η) 1− η
η
+
1− 4η (1− η)
2
c2. It is posi-
tive whenever (1− 2η) 1− η
η
+
1− 4η (1− η)
2
> 0. This is 2 (1− 2η) (1 − η) +
(1 − 4η (1− η))η > 0 or 0 < 4η3 − 5η + 2. This expression is positive for
0 < η < 1/2.Therefore, OFPC > OFNPC .
Case d. (Comparison of the outcomes with no price commitment
(θF∗) and price commitment (θ+))
Profit Comparison:
38 If η = 1/2, P+ = PR = c+∆qθ2 and the two outcomes coincide.
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Since π+ = 1−η4∆q
³
∆qθ
1−η − c
´2
and πF∗ = 14∆q
¡
∆qθ − c
¢2
we obtain that: π+ −
πF∗ = 1−η4∆q
³
∆qθ
1−η − c
´2
− 14∆q
¡
∆qθ − c
¢2
> 0 which clearly holds as:
¡
∆qθ − (1− η)c
¢2
>
(1− η)
¡
∆qθ − c
¢2
Agency’s objective function comparison:
Note that OFNPC = q
θ
2
2
− θ
2
2
−∆q θ
F∗2
2
and OFPC = q
θ
2
2
− θ
2
2
−∆q θ
+2
2
−
(1− η)P+
¡
θ − θ+
¢
. Hence: OFNPC−OFPC = ∆q
2
³
θ+
2
− θF∗
2
´
+(1− η)P+
¡
θ − θ+
¢
.
Substituting the diﬀerent variables and simplifying the expression we get:
OFNPC −OFPC = 1
4∆q
Ã
c
2
η (η − 2)
2
− ηc∆qθ +
¡
∆qθ
¢2 − (1− η)2 c2! =
1
4∆q
³
(η − 12η2 − 1)c2 − ηc∆qθ +
¡
∆qθ
¢2´
Hence OFNPC −OFPC > 0 iﬀ
¡
∆qθ
¢2 − ηc∆qθ − c2 ¡1− η ¡1− 12η¢¢ > 0.
Note that ∂OF
NPC−OFPC
∂c = −η∆qθ − 2c
¡
1− η
¡
1− 12η
¢¢
< 0
Hence, OFNPC−OFPC is decreasing in c if 0 ≤ η ≤ 1/2 and has a maximum
at c = 0, where the expression achieves a positive value of
¡
∆qθ
¢2
. The positive
root of OFNPC −OFPC is
c+ = 1−2η+η2+2
µ
−∆qθη +
q
4(∆qθ)2 − 4(∆qθ)2η + 3(∆qθ)2η2
¶
.
This implies that if c < c+ then OFNPC−OFPC > 0 and otherwise OFNPC−
OFPC < 0.
Recall that in case (d)
∆qθ(2+3η2−6η)
(1−η)(2+η2−2η) ≤ c ≤
2∆qθ
η+
√
7η2+2η
, we check the
relative position of c+ with respect to these two values:
1.
∆qθ(2+3η2−6η)
(1−η)(2+η2−2η) < c
+. This is that:
∆qθ(2+3η2−6η)
(1−η)(2+η2−2η) <
1
−2η+η2+2
µ
−∆qθη +
q
4(∆qθ)2 − 4(∆qθ)2η + 3(∆qθ)2η2
¶
→¡
2 + 3η2 − 6η
¢
< (1− η)
³
−η +
p
4− 4η + 3η2
´
→¡
2 + 3η2 − 6η
¢
+ η(1− η) < (1− η)
p
4− 4η + 3η2 →
2η2 − 5η + 2 < (1− η)
p
4− 4η + 3η2 →
(2η2 − 5η + 2)2 − (1− η)2 (4 − 4η + 3η2) = 18η2 − 8η − 10η3 + η4 < 0 →
18η − 8− 10η2 + η3 < 0.
If η = 0 the expression holds. If η = 1/2, then the expression is−1. 375.
Plotting the expression we find that 18η − 8− 10η2 + η3 is:
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2. c+ < 2∆qθ
η+
√
7η2+2η
. This is that:
1
−2η+η2+2
µ
−∆qθη +
q
4(∆qθ)2 − 4(∆qθ)2η + 3(∆qθ)2η2
¶
< 2∆qθ
η+
√
7η2+2η
→
1
−2η+η2+2
³
−η +
p
4− 4η + 3η2
´
< 2
η+
√
7η2+2η
(η +
p
7η2 + 2η)
³
−η +
p
4− 4η + 3η2
´
< 2(−2η + η2 + 2)→
(η +
p
7η2 + 2η)
³
−η +
p
4− 4η + 3η2
´
− 2(−2η + η2 + 2) < 0→
(η +
p
7η2 + 2η)
³
−η +
p
4− 4η + 3η2
´
− 2(−2η + η2 + 2) < 0
Note that if (η +
p
7η2 + 2η)
³
−η +
p
4− 4η + 3η2
´
− 2(−2η + η2 + 2) = 0
then η = −2. Indeed by plotting this expression we find that
(η +
p
7η2 + 2η)
³
−η +
p
4− 4η + 3η2
´
− 2(−2η + η2 + 2) is:
0.50.3750.250.1250
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
x
y
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If η = 0 then the expression is -4 and if η = 1/2 the expression is −2.
168 4× 10−19
In conclusion we obtain the following: If c ∈ {min(0, ∆qθ(2+3η
2−6η)
(1−η)(2+η2−2η)}, c+}
then OFNPC −OFPC > 0. If c ∈ {c+, 2∆qθ
η+
√
7η2+2η
} then OFNPC −OFPC < 0.
Case e1 (Comparison of the outcomes with no price commitment
(θF∗) and price commitment (θLIM ))
Profit Comparison: See the proof of lemma 10 for reference.
Agency’s objective function comparison: Note that OFNPC = OFNL =
q
θ
2
2
−θ
2
2
−∆q θ
F∗2
2
andOFPC = q
θ
2
2
−θ
2
2
−∆q θ
LIM2
2
−(1− η)PLIM
³
θ − θLIM
´
.
Recall that in case d we have proven that for c < c+ then OFNL − OF+ > 0.
Case e1 is relevant when 0 < c <
∆qθ(2+3η2−6η)
(1−η)(2+η2−2η) (< c
+). Hence in this case we
know that OFNL−OF+ > 0.We now proof that OF+−OFLIM > 0 to conclude
that in case d OFNL −OFLIM > 0 this is that OFNPC > OFPC
Proof that OF+−OFLIM > 0. This entails proving that ∂OF
+(P )
∂P < 0 where
OF+ = q
θ
2
2
− θ
2
2
−∆q θ
+2
2
−(1− η)P
¡
θ − θ+
¢
and θ+ = (1−η)P∆q hence: OF
+ =
q
θ
2
2
− θ
2
2
−∆q
( (1−η)P∆q )
2
2
− (1− η)P
³
θ − ( (1−η)P∆q )
´
; ∂OF
+
∂P = −∆q(
1−η
∆q )
2
P −
(1− η)
³
θ − ( 2(1−η)P∆q )
´
=
−∆q( 1−η∆q )
2
P − (1− η) θ + 2(1−η)
2P
∆q =
(1−η)
∆q
2
P − (1− η) θ.
Hence ∂OF
+
∂P < 0 if
(1−η)
∆q P − θ < 0 this is (1− η)P < ∆qθ. This is satisfied
as θ+ = (1−η)P∆q < θ.
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Figure 1: Demand function.
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Figure 2: Profit function.
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Figure 4: The OF function.
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Figure 5: The OF function with price commitment.
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Figure 6: OF function with price commitment.
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Figure 7: Listing with price commitment.
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Figure 8: Table 1: Impact of price commitment on listing decision.
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